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1The WTO and the EnvironmentEric Neumayer
The WTO and the Environment: Its Past
Record is Better than Critics Believe,
but the Future Outlook is Bleak
•
Eric Neumayer
This contribution to the ongoing debate on the impact of the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) on the environment provides a more positive view on its past
record than many critics would have it and yet is rather pessimistic with respect
to the future. In particular, it argues that the existing negative impact of the
WTO on environmental protection is hugely over-rated. At the same time, the
WTO has done little to promote environmental protection so far and there is lit-
tle hope that this is likely to change in the future. The responsibility for this im-
passe lies with the member countries of the WTO, however, not with the organi-
zation itself. The developed countries in particular are to blame for supporting a
greening of WTO rules only partially and only where it furthers their own inter-
ests. They have also failed to persuade developing countries that such greening
need not be detrimental to their economic development aspirations.
Negative Impact of the WTO on Environmental Protection is
Over-Rated
The WTO has done much less to hinder or damage environmental protection
policies than its critics believe. I will try to demonstrate this with respect to four
main points.
(a) WTO Jurisprudence does not have a Bad Environmental Record
WTO jurisprudence has become increasingly environmentally friendly. There is,
as Brack and Branczik1 note, “continued failure to make any substantial progress
in rewriting WTO rules—but signiªcant changes in the way in which existing
rules have been interpreted to deal with environmental concerns.” The WTO
agreements put few restrictions on environmental regulation of consumption
externalities, which refer to damage to the environment or human health con-
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nected to the consumption of goods. The one important exception is if the dam-
age is highly uncertain and somewhat speculative, a point to which I will come
back in the next section. Otherwise as long as these restrictions are applied
fairly, even-handedly and without discrimination against foreign producers,
they are compatible with WTO agreements even if they completely ban a certain
product. This follows from the appellate body ruling on the case “European
Communities—Measures affecting asbestos and products containing asbestos”
from 2001.2 The appellate body rejected Canada’s contention that asbestos
ªbers and non-asbestos ªbers are to be considered “like products” in the mean-
ing of GATT Article III. Just in case it also made clear that even if they were like
products, the European Union would still be justiªed to ban asbestos products
with recourse to the exception clause contained in GATT Article XX. Where WTO
disputes have decided against measures aimed at consumption-externalities,
this has been because the measures served more to protect domestic industries
than the environment. Telling examples for this are the cases “United States—
taxes on automobiles”3 and “United States—standards for reformulated and
conventional gasoline.”4 As DeSombre and Barkin5 have succinctly put it:
The reason that the WTO, and the GATT before it, usually ruled against regu-
lation that claimed environmental exceptions to international trade rules is
that the regulations were not particularly good; they were either clear at-
tempts at industrial protection dressed up in environmentalist clothes, or
they were poorly thought through and inappropriate tools for the environ-
mental management intended.
Production externalities refer to damage to the environment or human
health connected to the production of goods. GATT panels used to decide
against regulations aimed at so-called process and production methods (PPMs)
outside the regulating country’s own proper jurisdiction—see the famous case of
“United States—restrictions on imports of tuna” caught without dolphin-safe
nets.6 However, the 1998 appellate body ruling and the follow-on 2001 arbitra-
tion panel decision in the by now equally famous case of “United States—
import prohibition of certain shrimp and shrimp products” harvested without
sea turtle excluder devices changed things fundamentally.7 The appellate body
ruled that regulations aimed at PPMs in foreign countries need not necessarily
violate WTO rules as long as the country imposing the restrictions has under-
taken good-faith efforts at reaching a multilateral agreement, has applied the
restrictions in a fair, non-arbitrary and non-discriminatory manner, giving af-
fected countries some ºexibility in how to achieve the aim of natural resource
protection. Since the United States had not complied with these requirements at
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the date of ruling, the appellate body ultimately decided that the import ban
was in violation of WTO rules.8 However, the arbitration panel dismissed Ma-
laysia’s complaint three years later that the efforts undertaken by the United
States in the meantime were not sufªcient steps into the direction of rendering
the import ban compatible with WTO rules.9 The United States had started to
negotiate in good faith international agreements on sea turtle protection and al-
lowed shrimp to be imported on a shipment-by-shipment basis if it could be
shown that sea turtles were not harmed even if these shipments came from
countries, which had no comprehensive policy of sea turtle protection. With its
ruling, the panel basically upheld for the ªrst time trade restrictions aimed at
PPMs outside a country’s proper jurisdiction. That this ruling has not gained
more widespread recognition among environmentalists, rightly prompted
DeSombre and Barkin10 to contend that:
it was almost as though those campaigning against the WTO’s record on
trade and environment were loathe to admit that the organization could
come up with a positive ruling in what had otherwise appeared to be a string
of failures for environmental interests within the realm of free trade.
(b) Misunderstandings about the Dispute Settlement Process
In addition, there is some widespread misunderstanding about the dispute set-
tlement process and its implications. Critics such as Thomas11 ªnd fault with the
provision that an appellate body cannot reconsider the fact ªnding process itself
and are limited to examining whether the panel has interpreted the WTO rules
adequately in the light of its own fact ªnding process. However, this is not so
different from the judicial system of most countries where similarly higher
courts often restrict themselves to examining whether the lower court has ap-
plied the law correctly, but will not commence a new fact ªnding process.
He also criticizes that the appellate body in the shrimp-sea turtles case
made reference to the negotiation history of Article XX and has thus conferred
an “open-ended validity to the perspectives of negotiators of that by-gone
time.”12 That dispute bodies resort to the negotiation history in interpreting
rules is common practice, however. And to infer from this that the appellate
body applied anachronistic arguments in its evaluations is highly misleading.
To give an example: It is not without irony that the very same appellate body
criticized by Thomas13 signiªcantly extended the meaning of the terms “ex-
haustible natural resources,” contained in GATT’s Article XX. It noticed that
while the term might have encompassed merely exhaustible mineral or other
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non-living natural resources by the time of drafting in 1947, the words of Article
XX(g) “must be read by the treaty interpreter in the light of contemporary con-
cerns of the nations about the protection and conservation of the environ-
ment.”14 Emphasizing that the WTO’s commitment to sustainable development
in the preamble of the agreement establishing the WTO “must add colour, tex-
ture and shading to our interpretation of the agreements annexed to the WTO
Agreement,”15 it ruled that exhaustible natural resources should therefore en-
compass both living and non-living resources.16
Critics like Thomas17 also often fail to recognize that even though WTO
rulings become automatically authoritative unless consensually objected to by
all its members, no country can actually be forced to remove the restriction that
was found incompatible with WTO rules. What the country needs to be willing
to do is to accept retaliatory trade sanctions in response, which it should if it is
strongly committed to the environmental or health protection cause underlying
the restriction. Admittedly, this is only possible for countries that are strong
enough to weather the retaliatory trade sanctions. Thus, the EU has never lifted
its import ban on beef from hormone-treated cattle and the United States has
never lifted its import ban on dolphin-unsafe tuna. But this is not really an
option for poor and small developing countries.
(c) WTO rules have not Deterred Multilateral Environmental Agreements
WTO rules have so far not hindered, let alone blocked, any multilateral environ-
mental agreement (MEA). Most regional or international environmental agree-
ments do not contain any trade-restrictive measures,18 but some do and they
tend to be the more signiªcant ones. It is important to note that no provision
contained in a MEA or any trade restriction undertaken in (alleged) compliance
with any MEA has ever been disputed at the WTO. This is despite the fact that
some provisions in, for example, the Montreal Protocol, the Convention on In-
ternational Trade in Endangered Species, the Basel and Rotterdam Conventions,
the Agreement on Persistent Organic Pollutants and the Cartagena Protocol on
Biosafety might well conºict with WTO rules. The same applies to the Kyoto
Protocol and follow-up treaties. What this shows is that WTO members have
shown great restraint in this area. Of course, the potential for clash creates some
anxiety among negotiation parties. Those opposed to the MEA like to raise the
concern of a potential clash with WTO rules to further their argument. Given
the lack of agreement on how to resolve the potential for clash, recent MEAs are
at pains to state that MEA rules do not supersede WTO rules and vice versa.
However, to my knowledge it has yet to be shown convincingly that any recently
negotiated MEA is less ambitious because of concern over a potential clash with
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WTO rules, let alone that a MEA was not successfully concluded for that reason.
At the EU’s insistence, the compatibility between MEA and WTO rules also
forms part of the current negotiation agenda, a point to which we return below.
(d) WTO is not Responsible for Lack of Environmental Policies
Where trade exacerbates environmental degradation, the fault lies with non-
existing or insufªciently ambitious environmental protection measures. How-
ever, the WTO cannot be blamed for this. Much of the anger and frustration of
environmentalists is wrongly channeled at the WTO and its representatives,
whereas policy-makers in the WTO member countries are truly to blame. As ar-
gued above, the WTO puts few hindrances in the way of those enacting strong
environmental protection measures and it should not be blamed if policy-
makers fail to enact them. No doubt, we continue to observe environmental
degradation on a large scale. There is also no doubt that trade liberalization can
at times lead to increased environmental degradation if strong environmental
policies are not in place. Where massive negative environmental externalities
are allowed to exist, trade liberalization can be like a fresh breeze of wind on a
house that is already set on ªre. But it is the responsibility of the policy-makers
from its member states, not the WTO itself, to put these policies in place.
The Major Environmental Challenges at the WTO:
A Pessimistic Outlook
At the same time that the WTO’s past environmental record is painted too nega-
tively by its critics, there remain major environmental challenges and their
successful resolution is highly unlikely.
(a) The WTO does little to Actually Promote Environmental Protection
There is little doubt that the WTO has not done much to promote environmen-
tal protection and that much more could be done. There has been very little
progress toward removing trade barriers that are detrimental to the environ-
ment (so-called win-win options). These include ªshery, agricultural, coal and
road transport subsidies, all of which are harmful to the environment. But they
also include restrictions on trade in environmental goods and services such as
air, water and noise pollution abatement technologies, waste water and solid
waste management techniques. If these restrictions were lifted the costs of envi-
ronmental protection would be lowered, rendering strong environmental policy
more attractive.
(b) WTO Rules Fail to Include the Precautionary Principle Adequately
The WTO’s treatment of scientiªc uncertainty of environmental or human
health damage is highly ambiguous and in dire need of resolution. The precau-
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tionary principle allows preventive measures to avoid harm to the environment
or human health even in the absence of deªnite scientiªc evidence. Such cases
arise where such evidence is very difªcult or even impossible to provide due to
uncertainty and ignorance about future consequences. The incorporation of the
precautionary principle within WTO rules is fundamentally unsatisfactory. First,
the precautionary principle is currently found only in one WTO agreement,
namely in the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS Agreement). This needs to be rectiªed since WTO members
should have the right to justify trade-restrictive environmental or health protec-
tion measures with recourse to the precautionary principle outside the limited
conªnes of this agreement. Second, in its current form, the SPS Agreement al-
lows measures taken with recourse to the precautionary principle only provi-
sionally, thereby ignoring the persistence of scientiªc uncertainty. Such uncer-
tainty exists, for example, with respect to the dangers that mad cow disease
(BSE), beef stemming from hormone-treated cattle or genetically modiªed or-
ganisms (GMOs) represent to human health. The SPS Agreement requires mem-
ber states enacting restrictions to somehow “prove” with the help of a scientiªc
risk assessment the existence and relevance of the dangers. However, given the
high degree of uncertainty on either the likelihood of harm or the size of harm,
such a requirement is wishful thinking.
A consequence of this very unsatisfactory treatment of scientiªc uncer-
tainty within WTO agreements is that the WTO’s jurisprudence has become
tainted by decisions that seem insensitive to environmental and human health
concerns. This is why, for example, the appellate body upheld the panel’s
ªnding that the EU import ban on beef stemming from hormone-treated cattle
is in violation of WTO rules, even though the ban extends to domestic beef pro-
ducers equally.19
(c) The Greatest Challenge: Overcoming the Current Impasse
The WTO’s predecessor, the GATT, has had a so-called Group on Environmental
Measures and International Trade since the early 1970s, but it lay dormant for
two decades. The Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE), established at
the Ministerial Meeting in Marrakesh in April 1994, has discussed many issues
over ten years now, but without any conclusive or deªnite results. The CTE has
not become a frontrunner in triggering environmentally friendly reform of the
multilateral trade regime, but a forum for rather fruitless discussions. The usual
outcome of the CTE meetings is an agreement on members’ disagreement on
the relevant issues.
True, the Doha declaration from November 2001 for the ªrst time explic-
itly introduced the environment on the agenda for negotiations. However, on
closer inspection, the commitment to negotiations is conªned to the relation-
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ship between WTO rules and MEAs and to tariff and non-tariff barriers to envi-
ronmental goods and services. All other items are relegated to further discus-
sions in the CTE, which as argued above will lead to little. Furthermore, as Brack
and Branczik20 point out, it could happen that after the failure to reach any
agreement on the negotiations in Cancun in 2003, WTO members might want
to reduce the negotiation agenda to a more restricted set of topics. If that were to
happen, the environment could fall off the agenda again.
More fundamentally, the problem is that there is not enough support
among WTO members to render the organization and its rules more environ-
mentally friendly. Practically all developed countries are in favor of some green-
ing, partly by conviction, partly due to pressure from civil society. But their sup-
port is partial. For example, the US and Canada are most reluctant to assign any
more prominent role to the precautionary principle and the EU is highly reluc-
tant to reduce agricultural subsidies. But the greatest and almost unanimous op-
position comes from the developing world. Their representatives do not trust
the alleged idealistic intentions and suspect that the greening of WTO rules is
old protectionism in new environmental disguise.21 Marching arm in arm with
United States trade unions in the streets of Seattle at the Ministerial Meeting in
1999 was a silly thing to do for environmental groups. However, developing
country opposition to a greening of WTO rules is rooted in a much deeper frus-
tration with the distribution of beneªts from the WTO agreements, which are
regarded as biased toward developed country interests. Perhaps the greatest
challenge then is to reform the WTO rules in a way that is beneªcial to develop-
ing countries and therefore acceptable to them. If environmentalists and devel-
oped country representatives do not succeed in convincing developing coun-
tries that more environmentally friendly trade rules need not be detrimental to
their economic development aspirations, then any progress at the WTO will be
relegated to the panels and appellate body in the resolution of environmentally
relevant disputes.
It will be of tremendous interest to see how the panel and appellate body
will decide in the pending complaint of the US, Argentina and Canada against
the EU ªve year de-facto moratorium on GMOs. The complainants argue that
GMOs are perfectly safe, whereas the EU points towards scientiªc uncertainty
about the health and environmental consequences of GM products. The prob-
lem for the panel and appellate body should the dispute not become resolved
in the interim is that if they decide in favor of the complainants they jeopardize
the substantial progress that WTO jurisprudence has made toward accommo-
dating environmental concerns. If they decide against the complainants they
risk being accused of exceeding their competence and stretching the interpreta-
tion of existing WTO agreements to the extent of changing their substance
(from rule interpreter to rule maker). This complaint was already leveled against
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the appellate body in the shrimp-sea turtle case discussed above. However, that
these bodies ªll the void is a logical consequence of the WTO member states’
failure to lead the WTO-environment relationship out of its current impasse.
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